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2Hang-Sheng Cheng'"
Prior to the internationalfinancialcrisis in 1931, theprincipalbarrier
hindering adjustment by the international financial system to macro-
economic shocks was the fixed exchange rate system under the gold
exchange standard. The lack of international liquidity support also
contributed to the fragility of the international financial system. In
contrast, flexible exchange rates since 1973 andthe international liquid-
ity support that has developed since 1982 have helped avert an inter-
nationalfinancial crisis in the present, even though underlying problems
remain unresolved.
In recent years, as less-developed countries
encountered increasing difficulties in servicing their
debts to international banks, serious questions have
arisen on the stability ofthe international financial
system. In 1983 and 1984, at the peak of such
concerns, fears of widespread debt defaults con-
up the ofthe disaster of 1931 , when a
rapidly spreading international banking panic
brought down the international financial system,
createdhavoc inthe world economy, and lengthened
the duration and exacerbated the severity of the
Great Depression. In the last two years, the interna-
tional-debt situation has and
fears ofan imminent cataclysm have subsided. The
underlying international debt problem, however, is
not resolved.
* Vice President, International Studies, Federal
Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco. Helpful comments
were received from Milton Friedman, Frederick
Furlong, Robert Gemmill, Richard Herring,
Charles Kindleberger, Jiirg Niehans, Henry Wal-
lich, and Carl Walsh on earlier drafts ofthis paper.
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In the present calmer environment, it is useful to
compare the 1931 experience with the develop-
ments since 1982 for insight into underlying condi-
tions and policy responses. The comparison sheds
light on the workings of the international financial
system, the conditions under which it might break
down and plunge into crisis, as well as the policies
that mightbe helpful for averting orarresting crises.
This comparative historical study cannot cover
the gamut of issues on the conditions and policies
for ensuring international financial stability.
Instead, it will focus on two subjects: cooperation
for times ofinterna-
tionalfinancial stress, and the role ofexchange rate
flexibility in the international transmission of eco-
nomic stresses.
The article concludes that the lack ofan interna-
tional mechanism for providing liquidity support
prior to 1931 left the international financial system
virtually defenseless against systematic, pervasive
world economic stresses. In addition, the
exchange standardthenprevailing significantlycon-
tributed to the international transmission of mone-tary deflation and other economic stresses, gave
impetus to destabilizing speculative capital flows,
and severely constrained the ability of monetary
authorities to support the financial institutions in
their own countries during times ofstress.
In contrast, the flexible exchange rate system
since 1973 has released the major industrial nations
from the constraints ofthe gold standard and helped
them adjust to the series of large and pervasive
shocks to the world economy in the 1970s and early
1980s. Moreover, since 1982, an international
mechanism has been developed to the
essential international liquidity support for contain-
ing international financial crises.
I. The 1931 Crisis
The financial crisis that swept over Europe from
May to September 1931 and subsequently engulfed
the whole world was unprecedented in its severity,
scope, and speed with which it spread.
Calm Before the Crisis
As late as spring 1931, the international financial
system appeared remarkably stable, despite the
spectacular stock market crash in October 1929 and
theonsetofthe worldwide Depression. With declin-
ing world agricultural prices, economic depression
had begun in some far-flung countries and regions,
such as Australia and the Dutch East Indies in late
1927, and had then spread to Brazil and Finland in
1928, Argentina and Canada in the first half of
1929, and to the United States and most of the
European countries by the second half of 1929. I
Times were hard and businesses were failing, but
confidence in the soundness of the international
financial system was not weakened.
There appeared to be some grounds for continued
confidence. The outlying countries that first sus-
tained large declines in export proceeds were able to
counteractthe resultantbalance-of-payments strains
through acombination ofcurrency depreciation and
domestic deflation. Few resorted to exchange con-
trols.2 None - except the Soviet Union, Mexico,
Ecuador, and some local governments ofArgentina,
Brazil, and ofthe United States - had defaulted on
their foreign bond issues.3 International capital
flows remained largely unrestricted as an active
interbank deposit network provided international
liquidity to national banking systems bound
together on a gold exchange standard. For market
participants reared on a belief in the efficacy ofthe
gold standardadjustment mechanism, the unfolding
worldwide depression was merely following the
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samecourse as hadordinary slumpsofpast business
cycles.4
The surface calm, however, belied the increasing
fragility of the financial structure underneath. As
had the economic depression, the financial structure
started to crumble first in the peripheral countries.
From 1925 to 1930, bank demand deposits fell 27
percent in Australia, 16 percent in South Africa, 14
percent in Japan, 32 percent in Bolivia, 40 percent
in Chile, and 25 percent in Peru. 5 In contrast,
demand deposits either increased or were
unchanged in virtually all the industrial countries in
1930, even while they were engulfed by the Depres-
sion. A 1934 League of Nations' study attributed
this anomaly to banks' efforts to keep strapped
borrowers afloat by rolling over old loans and
extending new credits; the banks expected business
conditions to improve in the near future. In the
process, bad loans piled up and seriously reduced
the solvency of these banks.6
The stress on banking surfaced in 1930. But only
in the United States, with its unique system of an
extraordinarily large number of independent banks
(about 25,500in 1929), were there widespread bank
failures. Nevertheless, even in the U.S., banking
conditions appeared to be quite stable until October
1930, as the total deposits offailed banks up to then
were not significantly largerthan during the preced-
ing decade. In the next three months, however, a
rash of bank failures, starting from the Midwest,
climaxed in the failure ofthe $200 million Bank of
United States in December. The panic, however,
was shortlived and faded completely when the new
year arrived. 7 Moreover, it seemed only to be a
domestic financial stress with no noticeable impact
on banks abroad.
In the meantime, banking conditions in Europebegan to deteriorate quickly. Central banks man-
aged to keep the worsening situation from public
view by conducting secret rescue operations of
insolvent banks through acquisitions by financially
stronger banks backed by large central bank sub-
sidies.8 The undercover operations succeeded in
containing imminent banking crises - but not for
long.
Spread of the Crisis
The deceptive calm ended abruptly with a mas-
sive run on the Credit Anstalt, the largest bank in
Austria, in May 1931.9 The collapse of Credit
Anstalt was preceded by more than eighteen months
of worsening business conditions and mounting
loan losses in Austria. By the end of 1930, the net
worth of Credit Anstalt neared zero without the
public's knowledge. Ironically, it was the bank's
publication of an international rescue plan to write
offits loan losses and to replenish its capital that set
off a run that quickly spread to other Austrian
banks.
The central banksofmajorindustrial countries-
Britain, France, and the United States - did see in
this situation a potential threat to the stability ofthe
international financial system, but they underesti-
mated its seriousness. It took them three weeks of
acrimonious negotiations to come up with a paltry
$14 million credit to the Austrian National Bank
that was used up in five days. Negotiations for a
second $14 million bogged down over the French
government's insistence that Austria must agree to
abandon a proposed customs union with Germany.
After two weeks offrustration, the BankofEngland
unilaterallyextendedthe credit, but it was too late to
save Credit Anstalt. Bank runs and capital flights
quickly spread to Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
Romania, and Poland, which had special ties with
banks in Austria.
In June, the panic hit Germany. The Reichsbank,
the nation's central bank, lost nearly one-third ofits
gold and foreign exchange reserves in the first
twelve days of June. When asked for help, the
centralbanks responded with greateralacrity. Infive
days, a $100 million package was put together, with
the central banks ofBritain, France, and the United
States and the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) sharing equally. Again, the magnitude of the
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needed assistance was underestimated as the funds
lasted less than a week.
The rest of this story almost exactly duplicates
that ofthe Austrian episode. The Reichsbank asked
for more credits; negotiations again went nowhere
as the United States refused to take part if France
would not share the burden, while France insisted
on scrapping the customs union proposal and also
demanded that full warreparation payments resume
at the endofone yearofmoratorium; Britain, for its
part, wanted to tie the granting of credit to a final
resolution ofthe entire wardebtand reparationissue
that had vexed the major countries since the end of
the war. In the end, nothing was resolved.
In mid-July, the closure of the nation's third
largest bank, the Darmstaedter and National Bank
(the Danat Bank), triggered a full-scale run on
German banks. When the central bank's gold and
foreign exchange reserves were nearly exhausted,
Germany proclaimed a two-day bank holiday, and
then imposed exchange controls that effectively
sealed off the nation from the rest of the interna-
tional financial system.
In mid-July, the panic spread to Britain. On the
day of the Danat Bank failure in Germany, the
CommitteeofFinanceand Industryin Britainissued
its report (the Macmillan Report) revealing that
London's short-term claims on foreigners at the end
ofMarch had amounted to less than 40 percentofits
corresponding liabilities. The fear aroused was fur-
ther aggravated by large fund withdrawals by banks
in Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzer-
land, which were caught in a liquidity squeeze by
Germany's exchange controls. In the two weeks
ending on July 29, the Bank of England lost $200
million in gold and dollars, or one-quarter of its
international reserves.
Again, foreign central banks came to the rescue.
Interestingly, as the banking crisis spread from
Austria to Germany and then to Britain, the size of
the major central banks' joint rescue package
expanded rapidly: from $14 million for Austria to
$100 million for Germany, andthen to $250 million
for Britain. The last-mentioned, announced on
August 1, was shared equallyby the BankofFrance
and the Federal Reserve BankofNew York. Again,
the size proved inadequate. OnSaturday, September
19, the Bank of England's remaining gold andforeign exchange reserves exceeded its total obliga-
tions under forward exchange contracts and borrow-
ings from foreign banks by only £5 million. The
next Monday, England went off the gold standard,
suspending indefinitely the Bank ofEngland's obli-
gation to convert sterling into gold.
The shock ofsterling's downfall was felt all over
the world. Unable to use their funds in London to
sustain the gold convertibility of their currencies,
some thirty-three countries in rapid succession left
gold within a year. Only France, Germany, the
United States, and South Africa remained on the
gold standard. In the meantime, 27 countries
imposed exchange controls, and virtually all coun-
tries raised import tariffs or imposed import
quotas. 1O Annual international debt defaults rose
from near zero in 1930 to $520 million in 1931 and
$830 million in 1932. 11 International lending vir-
tually ceased. Total world trade in 1933 fell to only
35 percent of its average level in 1928-29. 12 With
remarkable the international economy disin-
tegrated along with the collapse ofthe international
financial system.
Although much has been written on the origin of
the Great Depression, there has been surprisingly
little systematic study on the causes ofthe financial
collapse of 1931 and on the policyactions that were
taken ornot taken for with the crisis. Such a
is beyond the scope of this paper, but some
comments on each of these two aspects might nev-
ertheless be useful.
Unquestionably, a major reason for the 1931
international financial crisis was the gradual but
steady spreadofthe recession that began in outlying
countries in late 1927. The prolonged and world-
wide scope ofthe recession eroded banks'
asset and capital positions, an erosion that couldnot
have been avoided by any degree of banking pru-
dence and asset diversification. Although the frag-
ility of the international financial system should
have been evident, there is little indication that
the banking community or national
authorities fully understood the situation. 13
While deteriorating economic conditions weak-
ened financial soundness, the resulting shrinkage in
finance in tumexacerbatedthe economic decline. In
16
the 1920s, long-term international lending took
place largely through the national foreign bond
markets, of which the American market was by far
the most important. Among the borrowers, Ger-
many was the largest, and the next five in declining
order were Australia, Canada, Argentina, Japan,
and India. 14 As recession spread throughout the
world, foreign issues in the United States fell from
$2.1 billion in the first halfof 1928 to $900 million
in the second half and only $450 million in the
second halfof 1929. 15 This abrupt decline is gener-
any attributed to the concurrent U.S. stock market
boom, which not only reduced U.S. capital outflow
but also attracted large volumes of foreign capital
inflow into the UnitedStates, turning the U.S. into a
net importeroflong-termcapitalby 1931. However,
the deteriorating economic conditions in outlying
countries, and their advance inward to the core
industrial countries, undoubtedly also contributed
to the sharp decline in long-term international lend-
ing.
The experience of economic contraction arising
from a compounding of export decline and the
international liquidity squeeze was common among
many countries prior to 1931. These countries
included Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bolivia,
Chile, Venezuela, Spain, and the Eastern European
countries.
Australia'sexperienceis illustrative. 16Thatcoun-
try had relied heavily on overdrafts at London banks
to finance its foreign trade. Itfloated long-term bond
issues to refinance short-term debts when the sums
became large. In 1927, as its export prices declined,
it began to pile up external debts and to feel the
limits ofinternational funding. In January 1929, an
Australian issue in London was subscribed to the
extent of only 16 percent. Monetary deflation in
Australia then set in. November, unemployment
rose to 13 percent, and sterling had to be rationed to
Australian Banks. The Australian currency began to
depreciate as a marketdevelopedoutsidethe trading
banks. By March 1931, Australia's currency had
fallen by 30 percent against the sterling and thus
shifted the burden ofadjustment to its export-com-
peting countries.
A major cause ofthe gradual deterioration ofthe
world economy in the second halfofthe 1920s was
probably the malfunctioning of the fixed exchangerate and its associated international trans-
mISSIOn of economic shocks and constraints on
national macroeconomic policies. In the first place,
after World War I, most nations returned to the gold
standard at pre-war parities despite the high infla-
tion that had intervened. Underpricing gold limited
the supply of gold for monetary purposes, with the
result of a general deflationary pall on the world
economy.
Misalignment of currency created additional
strains on the international economy. The over-
valuation of the sterling after 1925 combined with
the undervaluation of the French franc after 1926
gave rise to a large volume of speculative interna-
tional capital flows that made domestic monetary
management much more difficult. While payment-
deficit countries, such as Britain, had to adopt
restrictive monetary policies to protecttheirexternal
positions, payment-surplus countries, such as
France and the United States, were reluctant to
pursue policies for fear of
inflation.
The universal deflationary bias was probably a
major reason for slackening world aggregate
demand. The decline indemand first hitthe primary
producing countries - with low elasticities both of
demand and supply oftheirexports - and spread in
time to the industrial countries.
Concern overthe adequacy ofgold reserves acted
as a serious constraint on national authorities'
choice of appropriate policies for domestic mac-
roeconomic stabilization. Following the sterling's
collapse in September 1931, there were heavy with-
drawals of gold from the United States as foreign
central banks attempted to use the gold reserve to
defend their national currencies against speculative
capital outflows. To checkthe gold loss, the Federal
Reserve raised its discount rate from 1.5 percent to
3.5 percent in the two weeks ended October 16,
1931, and let banks' nonbrorrowed reserves fall
from $2.1 billion in early September to $1.3 billion
to the end ofthe year. From August 1931 to January
1932, the U.S. money stock fell at an unprece-
dented annual rate of 31 percent.I?
In contrast, freed from obligations of defending
fixed exchange rates after Britain went off gold in
September 1931, the Bank ofEngland was able to
reverse its previous deflationary monetary policy. In
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six steps over four months, it reduced its discount
rate from 6 percent in February 1932 to 2 percent.
Bank deposits responded by reversing a prolonged
decline, and rose from £1.6 billion in February to
£2.0 billion at the end of the year. StiJmulat~:d
interest rates declines - the Treasury bill rate
falling from 4.94percent in January to 0.55
in September - housing construction began rising
in autumn and reached a level in 1933 that was 70
percent above the level two years earlier. IS
Finally, the collapse ofthe international nn:il.nc:lal
system in 1931 also can be attributed to the
international actions to contain the of the
crisis after its start. The world community was ill-
prepared for the task. The only public international
financial agency that existed in 1931 was the
which was established only the yearbefore tofacili-
tate the transfer of war reparations and to prc)m1ote
international financial cooperation. With mil-
lion ofcapital, ofwhich only $21 million was paid
up at the endof 1931, it lacked resources ofits own
for coping with the crisis. 19
As described earlier, the major central banks'
joint actions to assist distressed national banking
systems were indecisive, distracted by extraneous
political motives, and were too little too late.
Throughout the developing crisis, the heads of the
central banks ofBritain, France, and the
United States kept in direct touch with one another
through letters, telephone cables, and occa-
sional meetings. Nevertheless, they lacked ade-
quate information on the extent of international
indebtedness20 as well as the expertise to deal with
it. In addition, there was neitheran mandate
from their respective governments nor a sense of
international solidarity that would have 0p.'U.,U
them to effective joint actions.
The international commercial com-
munity was equally ill-prepared for the crisis. Their
stakes were high,21 and theirvastfinancial resources
would have been essential for supplementing the
hmit~d means at central banks' disposal to stop the
spreading panic. Yet, they dragged their feet in
negotiating standstill agreements in the Austrian
and German crises, and joined the international
rescue operations for Britain only when it was too
late.22
In 1931, there was some recognition that withoutforceful adjustments in domestic economic policies,
external credits alone would not be able to ward off
speculative attacks on banks. The subject, however,
was not broached with the Austrian Government.
Negotiations for rescuing the German banks also
focused only on securing financial assistance. Only in
the British ca.<;e was the need for economic policy
adjustment made an explicit condition for obtaining
credits from foreign commercial banks. Throughout
August 1931, negotiations for foreign bank loans were
thwarted by the foreign banks' insistence that the
British government adopta budgetary reform program
for reducing its large budget deficit, and by the Labor
government's refusal to cut relief payments to the
unemployed at atime ofsevere recession. Only after a
new Conservative-Liberal coalition government
agreed to accept a budget cut was a foreign bank loan
assured. Throughoutthe negotiations, there was wide-
spread and bitter resentment by the public toward the
pressure exerted by foreign bankers on British domes-
tic economic policies. 23
In view of the foregoing review of the mac-
roeconomic causes ofthe 1931 crisis, it is doubtful
that domestic policy adjustments and international
financial assistance could have held the interna-
tional financial system together. The fundamental
problem was an international monetary order
characterized by fixed exchange rates with little
international policy coordination, that permitted
unobstructed international transmission of eco-
nomic shocks while severely constraining national
macroeconomic policy choices.
Gradually, but steadily, world aggregate demand
slackened and international long-term financing
dwindled amid swelling international speculative
capital flows. National policymakers, strapped to
the gold standard, were powerless against these
increasingly corrosive forces. Eventually, the world
economy disintegrated, crumbling the foundation
ofthe world financial system.
II. Experience Since 1982
The world economy seemed to slide toward
another major international financial crisis in 1982.
Most of the elements were there for the making of
another crisis like that of 1931, and there appeared
to be several striking similarities.
Similarities
The world economy suffered a severe and pro-
longed recession in 1980-82. Moreover, the start of
the recession almost coincided with achange in the
direction ofmonetary policy in several majorindus-
trial countries. The new policy aimed at controlling
a world inflation that had raged with varying inten-
sity in different parts ofthe world over the previous
fifteen years. The anti-inflationary bias in these
major industrial countries recalled the same policy
bias that preceded and prevailed during the Great
Depression. The result was unprecedentedly high
real interest rates in world financial markets.
The double shock ofhigh real interest rates and a
severe, prolonged worldwide recession drastically
changed the world economic environment and
simultaneously eroded the debt-servicing capacity
of a large number of debtor nations. As a result,
individual investmentrisks became systematicrisks
for those banksthat had vigorously pursued interna-
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tionallending as a strategy to diversify their port-
folios and enhance profits. The scope ofthe adverse
impact on international banking portfolios was rem-
iniscent to many observers of the precarious situa-
tion faced by international banks prior to the 1931
crisis.
Also recalling the 1931 crisis was the apparent
complacency with which nations regarded deterio-
rating economic conditions. The U.S. recession in
1980 was generally expected to be a short one -
lasting perhaps one year, which was the average
duration ofbusiness cycle downturns in the United
States since 1945. Under this expectation, both
lenders and debtors believedthat the properstrategy
would be to keep lending and borrowing because a
world economic recovery was "just around the
corner." Given optimistic expectations, lenders let
the quality of their assets deteriorate, while debtor
nations felt no pressure to make adjustments in
economic policies that had produced large budget
deficits, inflation, and over-valued currencies. In a
replay ofthe scenario prior to 1931, it was business
as usual under the common illusion that a world
economicrecovery wouldrestore the debtornations'
ability to repay their debts.
The illusion was shattered abruptly in September1982, whenMexico announcedthat itwas no longer
able to service its $86 billion external debt and
needed relief from its foreign creditors. The
announcement sent shock waves through the inter-
national banking system.
The world had not been aware of the high con-
centration of international debt in certain debtors
and lenders. At the end of 1982, nearly half ofthe
$700billiontotal external debtofthe less-developed
countries (LDCs) was owed by eight debtor nations:
Brazil,. Mexico, Argentina, Korea, Venezuela,
Indonesia, Chile, and the Philippines. The debt's
concentration in U.S. banks' portfolios was even
higher, as the same eight debtor nations accounted
for seventy percent of U.S. banks' claims on the
LDCs. Among U.S. banks, the nine largest
accounted for one-half ofthe total U.S. bank lend-
ing to the LDCs at the end of 1982.24The fear soon
became widespread that debt defaults or moratoria
by only two or three of the large debtor nations
could seriously damage the capital positions ofthe
world's largest banks, in general, and those in the
United States, in particular.
The 1982 Mexican debt shock was followed by a
precipitous decline in international lending. From
$27 billion in the first halfof1982, net international
bank lending to the LDCs declined to $12 billion in
the second half of that year and only $9.0 billion
during the full year of 1983.25 This sharp decline
recalled the international liquidity squeeze suffered
by debtor nations prior to the 1931 catastrophe, and
raised the fear that it would again precipitate wide-
spread debt defaults.
Signs of financial fragility quickly grew wide-
spread. From an average of one a year in the late
1970s, the number of less-developed countries'
bank-debt rescheduling rose to four in 1982, four-
teen in 1983, and twenty in 1984; the total amount
ofrescheduled bank debt increased from an annual
average of $0.9 billion in the late 1970s to $1.7
billion in 1982, $41 billion in 1983, and $113
billion in 1984. 26 Separately, bank failures in the
United States rose from an annual average of 8
between 1977 and 1979 to 42 in 1982,48 in 1983,
and 79 in 1984. The total assets offailed banks rose
from an annual average of$453 million in 1977-79
to $11.6 billion in 1982. They dropped to $7.0
billion in 1983 and $3.3 billion in 1984, but were
still high by historical standards. 27
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Fundamental Differences
The collapse to which these similarities pointed
has not materialized. Despite widespread anxiety
over its stability, the international financial system
has continued to function wen four years after the
Mexican shock. Debts have been rescheduledmany
times, but there have been no major defaults. There
have been many bank failures, but none attributable
to international lending as a primary cause. The
numerous manifestations offinancial stress, instead
ofgrowing and culminating in a crisis, have mark-
edly lessened in recent years.
The perceived parallel between the experience of
1982 and that of 1931, even ifto some extent valid,
has been misleading. The international financial
systemand the world economy had changedin three
fundamental ways since the early 1930s: industrial
nations now operate under a flexible exchange rate
regime; they have a mechanism for international
cooperationto copewithdevelopingcrises; andthey
have better safeguards to ensurethe stability oftheir
banking systems.
Flexible Exchange Rates
Perhaps the most important difference between
the two eras has been the international monetary
setting. No longerare the world'scurrencies pegged
to gold at fixed exchange rates as they were before
1931. The floating of exchange rates in February
1973 came none too soon as, within a year, the
world experienced its first oil shock and widely
divergent resulting impacts on the real income and
external-payment positions ofdifferent nations.
The floating exchange rates did not insulate the
oil-import nations from the shock, but they did
provide them with a mechanism to adjust to the
drastically altered relative-priceconditions in ways
that accorded with their own national aggregate
demand and supply conditions. Had the nations
attempted to maintain arbitrarily pegged exchange
rates, many payment-deficitnations would have had
to pursue deflationary macroeconomic policies to
keep their currencies in line. The 1974-75 world
recession would then have been much more severe
and prolonged. This same analysis can be appliedto
the second oil shock which took place in the
1979-80 period.
Flexible exchange rates cannot completely insu-late from the impacts ofoil price increases.
Those developing nations that were unwilling or
unable to make the needed adjustments to the price
increases and continued to rely on foreign borrow-
their domestic spending saw their
external debts rise rapidly and at higher realinterest
rates. In contrast, the industrial nations underwent
severe recessions in the period 1974-75 and again in
Hw'np'nfl,1i 1980-82to containdomestic inflation and
to the higher oil prices.
the time of the Mexican debt shock, the
industrial nations had about completed their adjust-
ments and were ready to begin recovery from tpe
1980-82 recession. Although reducing inflation
remained a primary policy objective, they also
aimed macroeconomics policies at restoring stable
output growth. In none ofthese countries was there
a deflationary bias for the sake of fixed exchange
rates, as there was before 1931.
Thus, a generally strong world economy
provided a sound base for international banks to
cope with sectoral shocks. The LDC-debt problem
was a sectoral shock to international banks, just as
difficulties in agriculture, construction and energy
industries were sectoral shocks for domestic banks.
To a varying extent, many international banks have
undergone, and are still undergoing, severe stress
according to the degree oftheir asset concentration
in LDC, energy, real estate and farm loans.
However, there is an important distinction
between individual bank stress and systemwide
stress. Individual banks with a large proportion of
their a<;sets in problem loan areas see their capital
positions seriously eroded. But because the core
countries in the world economy had adjusted suc-
cessfully to the shocks of the 1970s, the sectoral
shocks of 1980sdid not destabilize the international
as a whole. As a there have
few signs ofa generalized weakening in bank
capital positions, as occurred prior to 1931.
International Cooperation
Complare:d to 1931, international cooperation has
been strengthened for ensuring the
stability ofthe international financial system. There
are several facets to this development. First, in
contrast to 1931, when the newly established and
endowed BIS was the only public interna-
tional financial agency in existence, there are now a
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host of such agencies: the International M()n<~taJry
Fund, the World Bank and its affiliates, and various
regional development banks. Each has sizable
financial resources to assist stranded debtor nations
Pt<)vidirlj:?; ITlediunil- or long-term financial assis-
tance .as well as advice on policies needed for
reducing payment imbalances. Among these, the
pivotal role of the International Monetary Fund
cartnotbe overemphasized.
Second, and also in contrastto 1931 , the national
central banks of major industrial nations and the
BIS have, since 1982, acted jointly in a timely and
decisive manner to provide short-term bridge
credits to strapped debtor nations pending negotia-
tions for debt rescheduling and longer term new
credits from international agencies and commercial
banks.
Third, the international rescue packages of the
1980s also contained an essential element missing
in 1931: the cooperation of major international
commercial banks. These banks were willing to
reschedule debts and extend new credits to support
the debtor nations' adjustment programs for reduc-
ing payment imbalances.
Fourth, since 1974, there has been an agreement
among major national central banks to carry out the
lender-of-Iast-resort responsibility in cases where
banking operations involving more than one
national jurisdiction are in need of assistance. 28
Since then, the central banks have kept in close
contact with one another, frequently consulting one
another on the international banking situation, and,
as stated, undertaken successful joint actions to
provide short-term bridge credits to relieve the
world debt problem.
National Safeguards
Since the 1930s, national systems have
been made more crisis-resistant by deposit insur-
ance, government regulation and and
improved availability of information on banking
operations. Although these devices may have in tum
created problems oftheir own (such as the "moral
hazard" probleminvolving enhanced risk-taking by
financial institutions because external support is
available29), on balance, they have strengthened
national banking systems and hence indirectly the
international financial system.IU. Conclusion
An analogy with the functioning of a national
economy can help bring out the lessons ofpast
international financial crises. National economic
integration binds together the various regions of a
nation economically and financially through unim-
peded flows ofgoods, services and capital. While
benefits accrue to the nation through greater effi-
ciency in resource utilization, the various regions
are exposed to risks of economic and financial
shocks that originatefrom otherparts ofthe national
economy - especially since one national currency
ties the regional economies together.
This does not mean, however, that nationwide
banking operations are necessarily riskier. On the
contrary, since not all adverse shocks are likely to
affect the various regions of the nation at the same
time, national asset diversification can reduce the
total risk for such banks.
One type ofrisk, however, cannot be diversified
in this manner: credit risk related to unexpectedly
prolonged and severe nationwide recessions. Under
these circumstances, a general deterioration in the
quality of banking assets and in banks' capital
positions is hard to avoid. These risks are systema-
tic, macroeconomic risks that individual banks can-
not minimize through nationwide portfolio diver-
sification. Nor can governments contain such risk
through tighter bank supervision and higher bank
capital requirements. Instead, stability in the
national financial system requires national
authorities to conduct macroeconomic .policies to
minimize macroeconomic instability and to provide
liquidity support to banks when macroeconomic
instability results in severe financial stress.
In the global context, international banks can
reduce.asset risks through intemational·portfolio
diversification. Portfolio diversification, however, is
not sufficient against systematic, worldwide
instability that adversely affects asset quality every-
where. The likelihood of such instability is
enhanced under fixed exchange rates, which tie all
national economies together like regions in one
nation with one national currency- butwithoutthe
benefit of a single authority to ensure worldwide
macroeconomic stability.
Whennational authorities pursue domestic objec-
tives with little regard to their effects on the rest of
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the world, stresses often develop in the interrlation;al
monetary system that require countries with. a
citin theirinternational to restraindomes-
tic aggregate dernarld
countries in surplus to expand it.
deflationary pressure the world economy is
erbated if, in addition, the center country \a};alJll'"
whose currency other nations peg their ex€:h,mg:e
rates) itselffollows a deflationary policy in
combat inflation or to m'lintain
national currency. Where and wages are
perfectly flexible, a worldwide deflation will result
and lead to worldwide declines in aggregate
demand, with widespread business failures and
unemployment. As economic conditions worsen,
the basis ofthe international financial system crum-
bles.
This sequence of events, in essence, appears to
have caused the 1931 crisis. But, the world has
learned much from that disaster. Flexible exchange
rates have enabled the world economy to weather
several major shocks since 1973. As a result, the
internationalfinancial systemin 1982was in amuch
soundercondition than in 1931 ,andthus was able to
absorb majordisturbances suchas the Mexican-debt
shock. In addition, the world community also has
learned to formulate and carry out a coordinated
internationalstrategy to containthe LDC-debtprob-
lem in a timely and decisive manner. Thus far, the
strategy appears to have worked with considerable
success.
Nevertheless, keeping the LDC-debt problem in
check does not mean the problem has been solved.
A number ofdebtor nations continue to have diffi-
culty servicing their external debts. Capital flights
from these nations as well as the virtual cessation of
voluntary international private lending have put
these nations in a crushing liquidity squeeze. More
recently, the precipitous decline ofoil prices, while
providing a welcome relief to most debtor nations,
has meant a sharp setback to the debt-servicing
capacityofoilexportingnations. Moredifficultdebt
negotiations can be expected to lie ahead, and
innovative initiatives are needed to help resolve
international debt problem that continues to
threaten the long-run stability of the interr,ation,al
financial system.30Itwould be short-sighted to regard the LDC-debt
problem as the only threat to the stability of the
present international financial system. Numerous
innovations in telecommunication technology have
Illade wOrld capital markets more highly integrated
than everbefore. Also unprecedentedis the domina-
tion ofexchangerate changes by international capi-
tal flows. In the meantime, large international pay-
ments imbalances continue despite wide swings in
exchange rates. As a result, national governments
have been concerned about the volatility of
exchange rates and the lack ofpolicy coordination
among major industrial countries. Uncertainty
hangs over what these might mean for the stability
ofthe world economy since flexible exchange rates
cannot' be a panacea against all world economic
shocks.
In.short,. during the. half-century between. 1931
and 1982, the world has made significant progress
in buttressing the international financial system to
keep problems such as LDC debt in check. By
comparing the experience of the 1930s and the
current international debt situation, this study helps
identify the key elements ofthis progress on which
the solutions to future international financial prob-
lems can build.
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